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How the ALI’s Restatement Third of
Property is Influencing the Law of
Trusts and Estates
Lawrence W. Waggoner†
Restatements, once limited to restating existing law, are
now substantially devoted to law reform. The ALI’s website
states its law-reform policy thus: “The American Law Institute
is the leading independent organization in the United States
producing scholarly work to clarify, modernize, and otherwise
improve the law.”1
In 2014, the Brooklyn Law Review published a
symposium issue on Restatements of the Law.2 A paper in that
symposium argued against the ALI’s law-reform policy.3 The
† Lewis M. Simes Professor Emeritus of Law, University of Michigan;
Reporter, Restatement (Third) of Property: Wills and Other Donative Transfers. I
thank John Langbein for commenting on an earlier draft.
1 ALI Overview, ALI: THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, http://www.ali.org/
index.cfm?fuseaction=about.overview (last visited Oct. 29, 2014) (emphasis added).
2 Symposium, Restatement of . . . , 79 BROOK. L. REV. 381 (2014).
3 Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Why Restate the Bundle?: The
Disintegration of the Restatement of Property, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 681 (2014). The authors
discussed four discrete Restatements of Property: RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.:
LANDLORD & TENANT (1977), RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES (1997),
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES (2000), and RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.:
WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS (volumes released in 1999, 2003, 2011). Id. at 690-91,
693-95. The latter is the largest and most recently published of the four. It has three
volumes, eight divisions, 27 chapters, 135 sections, more than 1100 lettered comments, and
1468 pages (not counting tables and indices).
The Merrill-Smith complaints come from the perspective of property-law
teachers and some of them have nothing to do with the Donative-Transfers project. But
some of their complaints do relate to the Donative-Transfers project, and, as the Reporter
for that project, I wish to respond to their claim that that project has lost influence in the
development of the law. I would add that the Landlord-and-Tenant, Mortgages, and
Servitudes projects cover real-estate topics, are properly located under the Restatement of
Property umbrella, and are within the expertise of property-law teachers. The ALI has in
fact recently announced that it will begin work in 2015 on a Restatement (Fourth) of
Property, but that project will be limited to real-estate topics. See Press Release, American
Law Institute, The American Law Institute Announces Four New Projects, available at
http://www.ali.org/email/pr-14-11-17.html.
Donative Transfers is a trusts-and-estates topic and is within the expertise
of trusts-and-estates scholars. Donative Transfers could therefore logically be a
separate Restatement and be titled the Restatement of Wills and Other Donative
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authors specifically speculated that the reformist rather than
restatist character of the recently completed Restatement
(Third) of Property: Wills and Other Donative Transfers4
(Property Restatement) has “very likely” caused that
Restatement to lose influence—be ignored—in the development
of the law.5
Before expressing such a harsh judgment,6 one would
expect the authors to have examined the statutory and case
law, as well as the trusts-and-estates scholarly literature, to
see if there is any evidence that supports their case. They did
not. Instead, they based their claim of irrelevancy on the ALI’s
royalties from Westlaw downloads as compared to royalties
from the Restatements of Torts and Contracts.7 Although the
authors cite no comparisons based on dollars and cents, the fact
is that royalties for downloads is a superficial measure of the
impact of a Restatement. More important is what the
downloaders do with the downloads.
The law of trusts-and-estates has long been in need of
substantial reform. This short essay serves as an interim
report on how the Property Restatement is contributing to that
effort8 and, in the process, refutes the claim that the
Transfers. Because the future Property Restatement Fourth will be limited to realestate topics, the Property Restatement Third on Wills and Other Donative Transfers
will not be affected by the Fourth and hence the Third will continue to represent the
position of the ALI for the wills-and-other-donative-transfers topic.
4 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS
(2011); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS (2003);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS (1999)
[hereinafter PROPERTY RESTATEMENT].
5 Merrill & Smith, supra note 3, at 682. (“Perhaps most critically, the Second and
Third Restatements of Property have been given over to campaigns for legal reform, often
entailing the repudiation of earlier volumes of the Restatement, which has very likely
undermined the utility and the credibility of the ALI’s effort.”). For a similar point of view
regarding Restatements in general, and § 39 of the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION
AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT (2011) in particular, see the opinion of Justice Scalia, in Kansas v.
Nebraska, 135 S. Ct. 1042, 1064 (2015) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(“Over time, the Restatements’ authors have abandoned the mission of describing the law, and
have chosen instead to set forth their aspirations for what the law ought to
be . . . . Restatement sections such as [§ 39] should be given no weight whatever as to the
current state of the law, and no more weight regarding what the law ought to be than the
recommendations of any respected lawyer or scholar.”). Justice Scalia’s statement about the
weight to be given to a Restatement section ignores the deliberative processes of the ALI that
every Restatement section goes through before it becomes final. See Overview: How ALI Works,
ALI, http://www.ali.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=about.instituteworks (last visited Feb. 25, 2015).
6 Not to be overlooked is the willfully hostile subtitle the authors chose for their
article: “The Disintegration of the Restatement of Property.” Merrill & Smith, supra note
3, at 681 (emphasis added).
7 Id. at 681-82.
8 See generally John H. Langbein, Major Reforms of the
Property
Restatement and the Uniform Probate Code: Reformation, Harmless Error, and
Nonprobate Transfers, 38 ACTEC L.J. 1 (2012); Lawrence W. Waggoner, What’s in the
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Restatement’s reformist character has undermined its
importance. The Property Restatement’s influence extends to
all three pillars of law reform: uniform laws, decisional law,
and legal scholarship.
I.

INFLUENCING UNIFORM LAWS

There has been significant cross-fertilization between
the Property Restatement and uniform laws dealing with
trusts-and-estates.9
Unifying the Law of Probate and Nonprobate Transfers.
Although probate and nonprobate transfers occur at death and
thus are functionally equivalent, the law has historically
applied different rules to these categories. One of the broad
themes of reforming the law of trusts-and-estates is to unify
the law of probate and nonprobate transfers, so that the same
rules apply to both.10 The Property Restatement and the
Uniform Probate Code (UPC) embrace that theme in various
manifestations. For example, the law has historically held that
divorce presumptively revokes provisions in a will in favor of
the former spouse but has not applied the same divorcerevocation rule to nonprobate transfers such as revocable
trusts or life insurance. In an important reformist move, the
Property Restatement and the UPC extend the divorcerevocation rule to nonprobate transfers.11
Class Gifts. Division V of the Property Restatement,
consisting of four chapters and 19 sections, contains a
comprehensive treatment of class gifts, especially addressing the
newly emerged question of the rights of children of assisted
reproduction to participate as class members. Class gifts are widely

Third and Final Volume of the New Restatement of Property that Estate Planners
Should Know About, 38 ACTEC L.J. 23 (2012). The Langbein and Waggoner articles
are also available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2291160.
9 See Lawrence W. Waggoner, Why I Do Law Reform, 45 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 727, 731-36 (2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2231637.
10 See generally John H. Langbein, The Nonprobate Revolution and the
Future of the Law of Succession, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1108 (1984).
11 See PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, supra note 4, § 4.1; UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2804 (amended 2010). In Hillman v. Maretta, 133 S. Ct. 1943 (2013), and Egelhoff v.
Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141 (2001), the Supreme Court thwarted the achievement of that
goal for federally regulated or created nonprobate transfers. See John H. Langbein,
Destructive Federal Preemption of State Wealth Transfer Law in Beneficiary
Designation Cases: Hillman Doubles Down on Egelhoff, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1665, 1666-88,
1694-96 (2014); Lawrence W. Waggoner, The Creeping Federalization of WealthTransfer Law, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1635, 1638-42 (2014).
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used in estate planning documents. The Uniform Law Commission
(ULC) codified Division V in the Uniform Probate Code.12
Powers of Appointment. Division VI of the Property
Restatement, consisting of seven chapters and 42 sections,
contains a comprehensive treatment of powers of appointment.
Powers of appointment are central to estate planning practice.
The ULC codified Division VI in the Uniform Powers of
Appointment Act.13
Reformation to Correct Mistakes. The law historically
has authorized courts to reform inter vivos donative documents,
but not wills, to correct mistaken terms.14 Section 12.1 of the
Property Restatement adopts a reformation doctrine for wills
as well as for other donative transfers. The ULC codified that
Restatement provision in the UPC and the Uniform Trust Code
(UTC).15 In North Dakota, a state that has enacted the UTC
reformation provision, the state supreme court in In re
Matthew Larson Trust Agreement,16 noted that the Comment to
the UTC reformation provision states that the provision was
copied from the Property Restatement’s reformation provision.
The court then proceeded to quote extensively and with
12 UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-115 to -122, 2-705; see also Sheldon F. Kurtz &
Lawrence W. Waggoner, The Uniform Probate Code Addresses the Class-Gift and
Intestacy Rights of Children of Assisted Reproduction Technologies, 35 ACTEC L.J. 30
(2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1477961; Lawrence W. Waggoner, Class
Gifts under the Restatement (Third) of Property (Univ. of Mich. Pub. Law & Legal
Theory Research Paper, No. 266, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2006627.
In Astrue v. Capato, 132 S. Ct. 2021 (2012), the Supreme Court upheld the
Social Security Administration’s interpretation of § 416 of the Social Security Act as
requiring that state intestacy laws, despite being nonuniform, control the right of
posthumously conceived children of assisted reproduction (ART children) to Social
Security survivor benefits. See Waggoner, supra note 11, at 1658-62. In Mattison v. Soc.
Sec. Comm’r, 825 N.W.2d 566 (Mich. 2012), the Michigan Supreme Court held that ART
children born to the decedent’s widow are not entitled to take by intestacy under
Michigan law (and hence not entitled to Social Security survivor benefits). Id. at 570. The
Mattison decision prompted the Council of the Probate and Estate Planning Section of the
State Bar of Michigan to appoint a committee to study enactment of the UPC provisions
dealing with ART children. Full disclosure: I am a member of that committee.
13 The Prefatory Note to the Uniform Powers of Appointment Act states: “A
comprehensive restatement of the law of powers of appointment was approved in 2010
and published in 2011 by the American Law Institute. See chapters 17-23 of the
Restatement Third of Property: Wills and Other Donative Transfers. This act draws
heavily on that Restatement.” NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS,
UNIFORM POWERS OF APPOINTMENT ACT 1 (2013), available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/
shared/docs/Powers_of_Appointment/2013_UPAA_Final.pdf.
14 See John H. Langbein & Lawrence W. Waggoner, Reformation of Wills on the
Ground of Mistake: Change of Direction in American Law?, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 521 (1982).
15 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-805 (2014); UNIF. TRUST CODE § 415 (amended
2010); see also John H. Langbein & Lawrence W. Waggoner, Curing Execution Errors
and Mistaken Terms in Wills (Univ. of Mich. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper,
No. 207, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1653438.
16 831 N.W.2d 388, 394 (N.D. 2013).
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approval from the Property Restatement’s Comments and
Illustrations.17 In 2014, the Internal Revenue Service issued
private letter rulings accepting the validity for tax purposes of
UTC mistake-correcting reformations.18
Modification to Achieve the Donor’s Tax Objectives.
Section 12.2 of the Property Restatement adopts a taxmotivated modification doctrine for wills as well as for other
donative documents. The ULC codified that Restatement
provision in the UPC and the UTC.19 In 2014, the Internal
Revenue Service issued private letter rulings accepting the
validity for tax purposes of UTC tax-motivated modifications.20
Premarital and Marital Agreements. Section 9.4 of the
Property Restatement on premarital and marital agreements
regarding the surviving spouse’s elective-share and other
rights provides—for the first time to my knowledge—that
financial disclosure is not sufficient for the agreement to be
enforceable. Informed consent also requires disclosure of the
legal rights that the spouse or spouse-to-be is forgoing by
signing the agreement. The ULC adopted that position in the
Uniform Premarital and Marital Agreements Act.21
II.

INFLUENCING DECISIONAL LAW

The Property Restatement has also had considerable
influence with litigants seeking to change existing law or make
new law and ultimately with the courts in embracing the
Restatement’s proposals.22 It is important to point out that the
17 Id. at 394-95, 397, 399 (quoting and applying PROPERTY RESTATEMENT,
supra note 4, § 12.1).
18 See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul 151442-13 (June 18, 2014); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul
151441-13 (June 18, 2014), I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul 151440-13 (June 18, 2014), I.R.S. Priv.
Ltr. Rul 151439-13 (June 18, 2014), I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul 151438-13 (June 18, 2014).
19 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-806 (2014); UNIF. TRUST CODE § 416 (amended 2010).
20 See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul 151442-13 (June 18, 2014); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul
151441-13 (June 18, 2014), I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul 151440-13 (June 18, 2014), I.R.S. Priv.
Ltr. Rul 151439-13 (June 18, 2014), I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul 151438-13 (June 18, 2014).
21 See UNIF. PREMARITAL & MARITAL AGREEMENTS ACT § 9 (2012).
22 Only two cases, to my knowledge, have rejected a Property Restatement’s
reformist initiative: one a four-two decision on the reformation of wills, Flannery v.
McNamara, 738 N.E.2d 739, 745 (Mass. 2000), and the other on the inclusion of property
subject to a general power of appointment for purposes of the elective share of the surviving
spouse, Bongaards v. Millen, 793 N.E.2d 335, 347 (Mass. 2003). For criticism of Flannery,
see Martin L. Fried, The Disappointed Heir: Going Beyond the Probate Process to Remedy
Wrongdoing or Rectify Mistake, 39 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 357, 400 (2004). Dissenting in
Bongaards, Chief Justice Marshall said: “I dissent from so much of the court’s opinion as
indulges in the criticism of, or forecloses in any respect our subsequent consideration of, the
recently approved § 9.1(c) of the Restatement (Third) [of Property: Wills and Other Donative
Transfers].” Bongaards, 793 N.E.2d at 354 (Marshall, C.J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). Also, in In re Estate of Phillips, No. 01-0879, 2002 WL 1447482, at *1-
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following list does not include case law with routine citations to
the Restatement in support of existing law.23 Here, then, is a
list of decisions, compiled in alphabetical order by jurisdiction,
in which the court changed existing law or made new law on
the basis of the Property Restatement:
Ruotolo v. Tietjen.24 The court adopted the Property
Restatement’s position that mere survival language does not
trump an antilapse statute, saying: “In sum, we agree with [the
Property Restatement].”25
Carlson v. Sweeney, Dabagia, Donoghue, Thorne, Janes
& Pagos.26 The court, in a tax reformation case, adopted the
Property Restatement’s position that a mistake of law, as well
as of fact, can be the basis for reforming a provision in a
testamentary trust, saying: “We adopt the [Property]
Restatement[’s] view on this subject.”27
University of Southern Indiana Foundation v. Baker.28
The court abandoned the distinction between types of ambiguity
in construing instruments, saying: “We agree with [the Property
Restatement] and [other] authorities that the latent/patent
distinction . . . no longer serves any useful purpose.”29
Sieh v. Sieh.30 The court adopted the Property
Restatement’s position that the value of property owned or
owned in substance by the decedent is subject to the forced
share of the surviving spouse, even when the forced-share

2 (Iowa Ct. App. July 3, 2002), an unpublished opinion, the court declined to adopt the
harmless-error rule of PROPERTY RESTATEMENT § 3.3 on the ground that adopting such a
view was a matter for the legislature.
23 For citations of that sort, see, e.g., Morse v. Kraft, 992 N.E.2d 1021,1024,
1026-27 (Mass. 2013), which cites PROPERTY RESTATEMENT § 10.2 cmt. g and § 17.1
cmt. g with approval, BankBoston v. Marlow, 701 N.E.2d 304, 306 (Mass. 1998), which
cites PROPERTY RESTATEMENT § 12.2 with approval, and Miller v. Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania, 84 A.3d 620, 624-25 (Pa. 2012), which adopts PROPERTY RESTATEMENT
§ 7.1’s definition of “will substitute.”
Two additional decisions cite and adopt PROPERTY RESTATEMENT § 12.1 on
reformation on the ground of mistake: Estate of Irvine v. Oaas, 309 P.3d 986, 990 (Mont.
2013), and In re Irrevocable Trust Agreement of 1979, 331 P.3d 881, 888 (Nev. 2014).
Although these are cases of first impression in their jurisdictions, the donative documents
in question were inter vivos, not wills, so I have not listed these cases in Part II as
adopting the Property Restatement’s reformation doctrine for wills.
24 890 A.2d 166 (Conn. App. Ct. 2006), aff ’ d per curiam, 916 A.2d 1 (Conn. 2007).
25 890 A.2d at 177 (quoting and applying PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, supra
note 4, § 5.5).
26 895 N.E.2d 1191 (Ind. 2008).
27 Id. at 1200 (quoting and applying PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, supra note 4, § 12.1).
28 843 N.E.2d 528 (Ind. 2006).
29 Id. at 535 (quoting and applying PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, supra note 4,
§§ 10.2, 11.1).
30 713 N.W.2d 194 (Iowa 2006).
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statute refers only to the probate estate, saying: “We adopt the
view of the American Law Institute on this issue.”31
In re Estate of Beauregard.32 The court adopted the
Property Restatement’s position that preponderance of the
evidence, not clear and convincing evidence, is the proper
standard of proof for rebutting the presumption that a lost will
that is traced to the testator’s possession was revoked by act,
saying: “We follow the [Property] Restatement . . . on this
point, for the reasons [there] explained.”33
In re Griffin Revocable Grantor Trust.34 The court, on
“the basis of [the Property Restatement and other] authorities,”
concluded that “while [the Michigan statute on no-contest
clauses] does not apply to trusts, it reflects this state’s public
policy that no-contest clauses in trust agreements are
unenforceable if there is probable cause for challenging the
trust.”35 Later in the opinion, the court adopted the Property
Restatement’s definition of probable cause.36
Magnuson v. Diekmann.37 The court said: “Because
Minnesota caselaw on reformation pertains to contractual
rather than donative instruments, we turn to [the Property
Restatement for guidance].”38 The court then quoted and
applied several provisions of that Restatement dealing with
reforming a donative document to effect the donor’s intention.39
In re Martin B.40 The court, in a case of first impression,
held that the terms “issue” and “descendants” in trusts include
children conceived posthumously by means of assisted
reproduction, saying: “The rationale of the [Property]
Restatement . . . should be applied here.”41
31 Id. at 197-98 (quoting and applying PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, supra note 4,
§ 9.1(c) & cmt. j). The Iowa legislature subsequently rendered the forced share
ineffective by expressly limiting the nonprobate transfers subject to the spouse’s share
to one type—revocable inter vivos trusts. See IOWA CODE § 633.238 (2009); In re Estate
of Myers, 825 N.W.2d 1 (Iowa 2012).
32 921 N.E.2d 954 (Mass. 2010).
33 Id. at 958 n.5 (quoting and applying PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, supra note
4, § 4.1); see also id. at 957 n.4.
34 760 N.W.2d 318 (Mich. Ct. App. 2008).
35 Id. at 322 (quoting and applying PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, supra note 4,
§ 8.5 cmt. i).
36 Id. at 323.
37 689 N.W.2d 272 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004).
38 Id. at 274.
39 Id. at 275 (quoting and applying PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, supra note 4,
§§ 10.1, 10.2, and 12.1).
40 841 N.Y.S.2d 207 (Surr. Ct. 2007).
41 Id. at 211 (quoting and applying PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, supra note 4, § 14.8).
On November 21, 2014, New York Governor Andrew Cuomo signed a bill designed to diminish
the possibility that a posthumously conceived child of assisted reproduction can qualify as a

1026

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80:3

In re Estate of Herceg.42 The court adopted the Property
Restatement’s position that a will can be reformed on the
ground of mistake, saying: “[I]t seems logical to this court to
choose the path . . . recommended by the [Property]
Restatement . . . .”43
See also In re Matthew Larson Trust Agreement, supra.44
III.

INFLUENCING LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP

The Property Restatement is also influencing the third
pillar of law reform—legal scholarship. Just about every trustsand-estates law review article published lately cites the
Restatement for one or more propositions.45 The trusts-andestates casebooks are replete with full-section extracts from,
and other references to, the Restatement.46 A statutory
supplement that is widely adopted for classroom use
reproduces provisions of the Restatement alongside provisions
of the UPC and, where relevant, other uniform laws dealing
with trusts and estates.47

beneficiary of a trust. The new legislation will also necessitate significant attorney involvement
in order for such a child to benefit. The statute’s stringent requirements relate to highformality documentary evidence of the deceased genetic parent’s consent to allow posthumous
conception, post-death recordation of the decedent’s written consent, and post-death delivery
by the prospective birth mother of written notice of possible use of the decedent’s genetic
material for conception. The statute also imposes constrictive time limits for post-death
conception or birth. Finally, for wills or trusts that became effective before September 1, 2014,
as well as for decedents who died intestate before that date, the statute only allows a child to
take from the deceased genetic parent, not from an ancestor or any other relative of the
deceased genetic parent. See N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.3 (McKinney 2014). In a
report issued after the bill passed the Assembly, the Association of the Bar of the City of New
York urged the governor to sign it into law. The City Bar’s report praised the bill’s effect of
“limiting” the number of posthumously conceived children who will qualify as trust
beneficiaries. See New York City Bar, Report on Legislation by the Trusts, Estates and
Surrogate’s Courts Committee 1, 5 (July 2014), http://www2.nycbar.org/pdf/report/uploads/
20072610-PosthumouslyConceivedChildren.pdf.
42 747 N.Y.S.2d 901 (Surr. Ct. 2002).
43 Id. at 905 (quoting and applying PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, supra note 4, § 12.1).
44 See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
45 See, e.g., John C.P. Goldberg & Robert H. Sitkoff, Torts and Estates: Remedying
Wrongful Interference with Inheritance, 65 STAN. L. REV. 335 (2013); Steven J. Horowitz &
Robert H. Sitkoff, Unconstitutional Perpetual Trusts, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1769 (2014).
46 See, e.g., JESSE DUKEMINIER & ROBERT H. SITKOFF, WILLS, TRUSTS AND
ESTATES (9th ed. 2013); THOMAS P. GALLANIS, FAMILY PROPERTY LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS ON WILLS, TRUSTS AND FUTURE INTERESTS (5th ed. 2011).
47 See THOMAS P. GALLANIS, UNIFORM TRUST AND ESTATE STATUTES (201415 ed. 2014).
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CONCLUSION
The Property Restatement has influenced and is
influencing the law of trusts and estates. Its influence extends
to all three pillars of law reform: uniform laws, decisional law,
and legal scholarship. Any claim to the contrary is demonstrably
false.

